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Paul A. Sánchez Campos*

WHATEVER HAPPENED TO THE MEXICAN OIL
BONANZA? THE CHALLENGES OF MEXICO’S
NEW OIL FUND
ABSTRACT
From 2000 to 2014, Mexico exported around 9 billion barrels of
oil equivalent—representing approximately $562 billion dollars
(USD) in revenues—yet in December 2014, the remnant sum in the
Oil Revenues Stabilization Fund was just $2.9 billion USD. This
article analyzes the Mexican oil revenue management scheme used
in this period, using evidence to analyze various explanations of
how the Mexican oil revenues were used between 2000 and 2014
and to evaluate the institutional strength of the new Mexican Oil
Fund for facing challenges in the near future.
I. INTRODUCTION
There is a recurring question in resource-driven growth literature: “are
natural resources a blessing or a curse?”1 The empirical evidence is not conclusive
because it suggests that both outcomes are possible.2 The theory that mineral
resource endowments can become a curse for some countries is also known as the
“paradox of plenty.”3 It is also suggested that some countries have overcome the
paradox of plenty, turning their curse into a blessing through institutional
arrangements designed to promote socio-economic development.4
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1. Andrew Rosser, The Political Economy of the Resource Curse: A Literature Survey 3 (Inst. of
Dev. Stud., Working Paper No. 268, 2006); Nuno Torres et al., A Survey of Literature on the Resource
Curse: Critical Analysis of the Main Explanations, Empirical Tests and Resource Proxies 1 (Ctre.
Economia e Financas da Uporto, Working Paper No. 2, 2013).
2. Frederick van der Ploeg, Natural Resources: Curse or Blessing?, 49 J. OF ECON. LITERATURE
366, 368 (2010); Ragnar Torvik, Why do Some Resource-Abundant Countries Succeed While Others Do
Not?, 25 OXFORD REV. OF ECON. POL’Y, 241, 241–256 (2009).
3. TERRY L. KARL, THE PARADOX OF PLENTY: OIL BOOMS AND PETRO-STATES 24 (1997); Michael
L. Ross, The Political Economy of the Resource Curse, 51 WORLD POLITICS 297, 297–322 (1999);
MATTHIAS BASEDAU & WOLFRAM LACHER, A Paradox of Plenty? Rent Distribution and Political
Stability in Oil States 5 (German Inst. of Global and Area Stud., Working Paper No. 21, 2006),
http://edoc.vifapol.de/opus/volltexte/2009/1582/pdf/wp21_basedau_lacher.pdf.
4. Benn Eifert et al., The Political Economy of Fiscal Policy and Economic Management in Oil
Exporting Countries 7–10 (World Bank, Working Paper No. 2899, 2002); Frederick van der Ploeg, supra
note 2, at 368; see Ragnar Torvik, supra note 2, at 241–56; see also Halvor Mehlum et al., Cursed by
Resources or Institutions?, 29 WORLD ECON., 1117, 1117–1131 (2006).
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The literature places the case of the Mexican oil sector in the first category.5
In other words, its own oil bonanza has been a curse for Mexico, which is still
bounded by the paradox of plenty. Once ranked as the world’s fourth largest oil
producer (in 2002), Mexico ranked as the tenth oil producer in 2014.6 The stylized
facts of this phenomena are: a) Mexico’s oil production is declining; b) Mexico’s oil
exports are decreasing; c) Mexico’s oil derivatives imports are increasing; d) in the
last 15 years, Mexico exported around 9 billion barrels of oil and other liquids and
derivatives, representing a revenue of $562 billion USD in 2010; and e) Mexico’s
former oil rent management scheme has only around $2.9 billion USD.7
This article explores the three-way trade-off that oil exporting countries
face between stabilizing, saving, or investing their oil rent in order to identify the
institutional differences between those countries which have been trapped in the
paradox of plenty and those which have overcome it. In addition, within the Mexican
context, this article considers the challenges decision-makers face in allocating the
rent and balance, presently, along with future needs, and the role that national oil
funds play in turning the oil curse into a blessing.
This article discusses the hand-to-mouth policy pursued by the Mexican
government using the former Mexican oil rent management scheme. In doing so, it
uses the lens of resource-driven growth framework in order to understand why the
Mexican case exemplifies a state trapped in the paradox of plenty. The main goal is
to identify the challenges facing the new Mexican Oil Fund for Stabilization and
Development, created in 2013.8
This article first focuses on the notion of the “paradox of plenty” in
resource-rich countries, in order to give context to its causes and consequences.
Then, the article reviews the literature on oil rent management. This is followed by
a study on Mexico’s oil dynamics during the 15-year period between 2000 and 2014.
After that, the article focuses on the Mexican case of oil rent management using the
framework from section three. Finally, the last section examines the new Mexican
Oil Fund created by the recent Mexican Energy Reform, aiming to identify the
challenges that this new oil revenue management mechanism will face.
II. THE PARADOX OF PLENTY
Some natural resources—those limited in supply, and mainly those with
inelastic demand—generate economic rent.9 Unlike profit, which represents the
returns for developing goods from natural resources, economic rent represents the

5. Mehlum, supra note 4, at 1121; Torvik, supra note 2, at 246; Ploeg, supra note 2, at 24;
NAAZNEEN H. BARMA ET AL., RENTS TO RICHES? THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF NATURAL RESOURCELED DEVELOPMENT 82 (The World Bank, 2012).
6. INT’L ENERGY DATA AND ANALYSIS [hereinafter INT’L ENERGY DATA], http://www.eia.gov/
beta/international/ (last visited May 24, 2016).
7. See infra Parts V.1–V.4.
8. Ley del Fondo Mexicano del Petróleo para la Estabilización y el Desarrollo [hereinafter LFMED],
Diario Oficial de la Federación [DOF] 8 de noviembre, 2014 (Nov. 8, 2014) (Mex.).
9. Examples of this kind of resources include oil, gas, cooper, silver, gold, coal, diamond, thorium,
lead, and zinc, among others.
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payment received by a resource owner that exceeds its opportunity costs.10 Since
non-renewable resources cannot be recreated, competition is restricted, which means
that economic rent in non-renewable resources is the product of an imperfect market
caused by natural barriers to entry. Considering this, countries with abundant rentgenerating natural resources should be wealthy, as they are able to seize rents without
a significant factor of production investment.11 Nevertheless, reality is more
complex.
Evidence suggests that the economic performance of resource-rich
countries is, in most cases, worse than their resource-poor counterparts.12 The
phenomenon of resource-rich countries with poor economic performance is known
as the “paradox of plenty,”13 or the “resource curse.”14 The paradox of plenty
explains how some economies with abundant natural resources have experienced
slower growth rates than economies without significant natural resources.15 Though
there is no consensus on what causes this paradox, there are three dominant
hypotheses: the 1) structuralist; 2) behaviorist; and 3) institutionalist explanations.16
1. Structuralist Explanation: Dutch Disease
The structuralist explanation of the paradox of plenty relates to the Dutch
Disease concept. The Dutch Disease concept explains the contrast between an
externally growing yet internally troubled economy. Based in an empirical case in
Netherlands, The Economist introduced the term in 1977 to refer to “the adverse
effects on Dutch manufacturing of the natural gas discoveries of the nineteen sixties,
essentially through the subsequent appreciation of the Dutch real exchange rate.”17
Sudden booms in natural resource sectors may result in a loss of competitiveness in
other productive sectors, such as the manufacturing and agriculture sectors.18
The structuralist thesis proposes that a sudden boom in the natural resource
sector is followed by an increase in the export of raw goods from that sector and a
decrease of production and exports of non-boom productive sectors, resulting in
appreciation of the real exchange rate. Capital and labor move from the non-booming

10. Robert D. Tollison, Rent Seeking: A Survey, 35 KYKLOS, 575, 578 (1982); Joseph T. Mahoney
& Rajendran Pandian, The Resource-Based View Within the Conversation of Strategic Management, 13
STRATEGIC MGMT. J., 363, 364–365 (1992).
11. RAYMOND J. LEARSY, OVER A BARREL: BREAKING THE MIDDLE EAST OIL CARTEL 57–61
(2005); GEOFFREY HEAL, ESCAPING THE RESOURCE CURSE 155–171 (2007).
12. Rosser, supra note 1, at 7–13; Torres, supra note 1, at 13.
13. Karl, supra note 3, at 242
14. See RICHARD M. AUTY, SUSTAINING DEVELOPMENT IN MINERAL ECONOMIES: THE RESOURCE
CURSE THESIS (1993).
15. See Jeffrey D. Sachs & Andrew M. Warner, Natural Resource Abundance and Economic Growth
(Harv. Inst. for Int’l Dev., Working Paper, 1995), http://www.cid.harvard.edu/ciddata/warner_files/
natresf5.pdf; see also Jeffrey D. Sachs & Andrew M. Warner, Natural Resource Abundance and
Economic Growth (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research., Working Paper 5398, 1995), http://www.nber.org/
papers/w5398.pdf (substantially revised).
16. Torres, supra note 1, at 3–7.
17. W. Max Corden, Booming Sector and Dutch Disease Economics: Survey and Consolidation, 36
OXFORD ECON. PAPERS, 359, 359 (1984).
18. See id.
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sectors to the booming sector, producing a national de-industrialization.19 The long
term consequences are “a fall in manufacturing output and employment, a worsening
of the balance of trade in manufacturing, and a fall in the real return to factors specific
to the manufacturing sector.”20
According to the structuralist explanation, the paradox of plenty revolves
around growing national income and the negative effects of de-industrialization on
economic growth. On one hand, national income increases because there are higher
revenues coming from the natural resource sector; hence, there is a rise in national
demand for services and other goods. This rise in consumption is covered by an
increase in imported goods, which is financed with the increase of national income.
Thus, “the resource bonanza increases welfare.”21
On the other hand, the exchange rate appreciation makes it more difficult to
export goods other than natural resource commodities, and cheaper to import goods
from the international market than to buy them from local producers. In addition,
labor and capital shift to the booming sector and service sector, and the non-booming
productive sectors lag—resulting in de-industrialization.22 The literature proposes
that, in the long term, de-industrialization has negative impacts on national savings,
physical investment, entrepreneurship, and education and human capital formation,
thus creating the paradox of plenty.23
2. Behaviorist Explanation: Rent-Seeking
The second thesis, based on the behaviorist explanation, explains that the
paradox of plenty is caused by the rent-seeking behavior of some key actors. This
behavior takes root in the notion of egoistic rationality (or “rational egoism”). Public
choice theory has created a body of work on the assumption of egoistic rationality:
“the basic behavioral postulate of public choice, as for economics, is that man is an
egoistic, rational, utility maximizer.”24 From this framework, humans are selfinterested beings who will rationally plan their actions in order to obtain the outcome
that best maximizes utility, even if the outcome produces socially negative
consequences. Hence, as natural resources produce rent, some key actors, with the
aforementioned characteristics, engage in rent-seeking activities.
19. W. Max Corden & J. Peter Neary, Booming Sector and De-Industrialization in a Small Open
Economy, 92 THE ECON. J., 825, 825–848 (1982); Ploeg, supra note 2, at 8–12.
20. Id. at 841. Note that the authors were using the manufacturing sector as an example; these
consequences apply to all non-boom productive sectors.
21. Ploeg, supra note 2, at 10.
22. GEOFFREY HEAL, ESCAPING THE RESOURCE CURSE 3–6 (Macartan Humphreys et al eds., 2007).
23. See Sachs & Warner, supra note 15, at 5 (using Mexico, Nigeria and Venezuela as oil-rich
countries that had gone bankrupt in the 1990 decade); Jeffrey D. Sachs & Andrew M. Warner, The Curse
of Natural Resources, 45 EURO. ECON. REV. 827, 828 (2001) (trying to explain the curse using the
Nigerian case); Thorvaldur Gylfason, Natural Resources, Education and Economic Eevelopment, 45
ECON. REV. 847, 848 (2001) (comparing the case of resource-rich countries such as Botswana, Indonesia,
Malaysia and Thailand against countries with few raw materials such as Taiwan, Singapore, South Korea,
and Hong Kong); see also Claudio Bravo-Ortega & José De Gregorio, The Relative Richness of the Poor?
Natural Resources, Human Capital and Economic Growth 1, 2. (Central Bank of Chile, Working Paper
No. 139, 2002) (comparing the economic performance of resource-rich countries from both Scandinavia
and Latin America).
24. Dennis C. Mueller, Public Choice: A Survey, 14 J. OF ECON. LIT. 395, 395 (1976).
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In sum, rent-seeking describes the “behavior in institutional settings where
individual efforts to maximize value generate social waste rather than social
surplus.”25 Rent-seeking is mainly associated with actors trying to obtain an
advantageous market position through government action; thus, the government
actions or inactions “give rise to rents of a variety of forms, and people often compete
for the rents.”26
According to the behaviorist explanation, behavior from both rent-seekers
and politicians causes the paradox. On one hand, as rational actors, rent-seekers focus
their expenditures and efforts in order to obtain the advantage. On the other,
government officials focus their efforts on obtaining the expenditures of the rentseekers. This formula can result in bribery and corruption.27 Knowing this,
entrepreneurs, who rationally are risk-adverse, compete to gain the favor of the
political elite. Explaining the curse of abundant resources, Torvik concludes that
“through rent seeking more natural resources generate a negative multiplier effect,
and the net result is lower income.”28
3. Institutionalist Explanation: Institutional Quality
The third thesis, based on institutionalism, stresses that the paradox of
plenty is caused by poor-quality institutional arrangement, and, in contrast, a highquality institutional arrangement can turn the resource curse into a blessing.29 From
this perspective, institutions matter in resource-driven growth. One of the best known
definitions of institutions was proposed by Douglass North: “institutions are the rules
of the game in a society.”30 Institutions’ raison d’être is to constrain human behavior
to reduce uncertainty and incentive social relations. Sharing this notion, a certain
degree of consensus emerged from the New Institutional Economics (NIE) School,
pointing to the importance of institutions in economic growth.31
The consensus of the NIE literature is that countries with high-quality
institutions perform better than countries with poor-quality institutions. The
institutional explanation of the paradox of plenty brings this framework to the

25. JAMES M. BUCHANAN, 40 YEARS OF RESEARCH ON RENT SEEKING 1: THEORY OF RENT SEEKING
55–68 (Roger D. Congleton et al. eds., 2008).
26. Anne O. Krueger, The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society, 64 THE AM. ECON. REV.
291, 291 (1974).
27. Rosser, supra note 1, at 15 (2hen political elites have the right to allocate natural resources, then
they will take the opportunity to seize a share of the rent, often in the form of bribes).
28. Torvik, supra note 2, at 251. See also J.M. Baland & P. Francois, Rent-seeking and Resource
Booms, J. OF DEVELOPMENT ECON., 61, 527–42 (2000); R. Hodler, The Curse of Natural Resources in
Fractionalized Countries, EUROPEAN ECON. REV. 1367–86 (2006); K. Wick and E. Bulte, Contesting
Resources—Rent Seeking, Conflict and the Natural Resource Curse, PUBLIC CHOICE, 128, 457–76 (2006).
29. Mehlum, supra note 4, at 1121; Rosser, supra note 1, at 21–23; Ploeg, supra note 2, at 15–18;
Barma, supra note 5, at 3–4; Torres, supra note 1, at 4–7.
30. DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE
3 (1990).
31. Oliver E. Williamson, The New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock, Looking Ahead, 38 J. OF
ECON. LITERATURE 595, 595–596 (2000); DARON ACEMOGLU, INTRODUCTION TO MODERN ECONOMIC
GROWTH 119–121 (2009); DARON ACEMOGLU & JAMES A. ROBINSON, WHY NATIONS FAIL: THE
ORIGINS OF POWER, PROSPERITY, AND POVERTY 7–11 (2012).
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resource curse problem, concluding that high-quality institutions have performed
better in investment and savings than their counterparts.32
Mehlum proposes that countries with poor-quality institutions cannot
benefit from growing income due to the proliferation of “wealth-grabbers”:
“dysfunctional democracies invite political rent appropriation; low transparency
invites bureaucratic corruption; weak protection of property rights invite shady
dealings, unfair takeovers, and expropriation; weak protection of citizens’ rights
invite fraud and venal practices; weak rule of law invites crime, extortions, and mafia
activities; a weak state invites ‘warlordism.’”33
From the institutionalist explanation, the paradox of plenty has its origins
in poor-quality institutions, which foster wealth-grabbing and weaken redistribution
mechanisms. In consequence, despite a nation’s having a higher income resulting
from higher natural resource revenues, inefficient redistribution mechanisms cause
aggregate income to decrease.
III. OIL REVENUES MANAGEMENT
Oil is a commodity, which has a set of characteristics that make it an
interesting case study of the paradox of plenty. Oil is a non-renewable resource with
virtually no substitutes; hence, its demand and supply are highly inelastic with
respect to price. Considering these characteristics, the market price of oil is not
aligned with its marginal cost, which means it generates scarcity rent: the less oil
there is, the higher its present value, and the less value to future generations.34
Oil is a rent-generating natural resource, which means that oil-producing
countries are prone to negative effects of the resource curse. The literature has found
empirical evidence of both countries that have been cursed by their oil richness and
countries that have been blessed by it.35 As a result, the challenge for resource-rich
countries is how to best manage their oil revenues and overcome the paradox of
plenty. Oil revenues can be used for: 1) stabilizing the present economy; 2) saving
for the future; or 3) investing in living and future generations.36 Therefore, oil-rich
countries face a three-way trade-off between stabilizing, saving, or investing their
oil rent.

32. Giles Atkinson & Kirk Hamilton, Savings, Growth and the Resource Curse Hypothesis, 31
WORLD DEV. 1793, 1794 (2003).
33. Mehlum, supra note 4, at 1121.
34. Bassam Fattouh, The Drivers of Oil Prices: The Usefulness and Limitations of Non-Structural
Model, the Demand–Supply Framework and Informal Approaches 2 (Ctr. for Fin. and Mgmt. Stud.,
Working Paper No. 71, 2007).
35. Karl, supra note 3, at 8; Mehlum, supra note 4, at 1121; Anca Cotet & Kevin Tsui, Resource
Curse or Malthusian Trap? Evidence from Oil Discoveries and Extractions 28 (Ball St. U., Dep’t of Econ.,
Working Paper No. 1, 2010); James L. Butkiewicz & Halit Yanikkaya, Minerals, Institutions, Openness,
and Growth: An Empirical Analysis, 86 LAND ECON. 313, 317 (2010); Barma, supra note 5, at 3–4. While
the Nigeria, Angola, and Venezuela have struggled to distribute the benefits of present revenue, Norway,
Botswana, and Alaska have experienced greater success.
36. Eifert, supra note 4, at 3–5.
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1. Stabilizing
Historically, oil prices have been characterized as being highly volatile—
sometimes the price soars and other times it busts.37 Thus, using part of the oil rent
for stabilization could help protect the economy from unpredictable fluctuations. De
Ferranti explains that stabilization is “a form of self-insurance that allows for a
transfer of resources between price booms and busts.”38
Countries establish Oil Stabilization Funds (OSFs) to cope with price
fluctuations. OSFs are not created for long-term saving, but rather for short-term
stabilization. Some authors stress that the horizon of OSFs should not be longer than
three or five years.39 Ahmad and Mottu point out that the drawback of the OSF
mechanism is “[t]he possibility of establishing a parallel budget mechanism, often
with less oversight that the regular budget.”40 In order to overcome this, it is crucial
to strengthen the OSF’s with transparency and accountability mechanisms.
2. Saving
Because oil is a non-renewable resource, there is a notion that oil revenues
should have intergenerational benefits.41 In order to achieve this objective, countries
establish saving funds. The aim of establishing these funds is “to set aside resource
revenue for future consumption [since] saving funds can enable future generations
to benefit from the extraction, by converting finite revenue into a long-term financial
flow.”42
There are two types of saving funds: National Based Funds and Sovereign
Wealth Funds. National Based Funds (NBFs) are funds installed inside the country,
enabling governments to borrow from them to stabilize their finances. As NBFs have
no external oversight mechanism, they are frequently redesigned to respond to
political and economic priorities; hence, they are vulnerable to misuse.43 The
Mexican Oil Revenue Stabilization Fund that operated from 2000 to 2015 is an
example of this kind of fund and will be explored in the next section.

37. Oil Prices, BP.com, http://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/energy-economics/statistical-revie
w-of-world-energy/oil-review-by-energy-type/oil-prices.html (last visited Dec. 10, 2015).
38. Barma, supra note 5, at 178.
39. See Naief Al-Mutairi, Determining the Sources of Output Fluctuations in Kuwait, 11 FIN. AND
INDUSTRY 20, 20–78 (1993); Mohsen Mehrara & Karman N. Oskoui, The Sources of Macroeconomic
Fluctuations in Oil Exporting Countries: A Comparative Study. 24 ECON. MODELLING 365, 372–373
(2007).
40. See, e.g., Eric Ahmad & Ehtisham Mottu, Oil Revenue Assignments: Country Experiences and
Issues 11 (IMF, Working Paper No. 02/203, 2002) (using as an example the Kuwaiti Reserve Fund for
Future Generations, which permitted the Kuwaiti government to borrow for the reconstruction of the
country after the Iraqi occupation without the oversight that the regular budget would have. In contrast,
the authors point that the Norwegian Fund has a good oversight mechanism as all resources coming into
the Norwegian Fund are reported to the Parliament, which must authorize any transfer from the Fund to
the budget).
41. Eifert, supra note 4, at 12; Barma, supra note 5, at 178–180.
42. Martin Gould, Managing Manna from Below: Sovereign Wealth Funds and Extractive Industries
in the Pacific 1 ECON. ROUND-UP 63, 66–68 (2010).
43. Ahmad & Mottu, supra note 40, at 11; Udaibir S. Das et al., Setting up a Sovereign Wealth Fund:
Some Policy and Operational Considerations 10 (IMF, Working Paper No. 09/179, 2009).
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In contrast, Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs) are sovereign investment
vehicles with foreign exposure and long-term horizons.44 Oil-rich countries like
Norway, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and China, among others,
have established SWFs in order to save wealth for future generations and to assess
the sustainability of the long-term expenditure path.45 The most prominent example
of an SWF is the Norwegian Oil Fund, which has a good oversight mechanism as all
the resources coming into the Fund are reported to the Norwegian Parliament, which
must authorize any transfer from the Fund to the budget. Comparing the performance
of NBFs—e.g. Kuwait’s46 and Mexico’s—with the performance of Norway’s SWF,
it can be said that SWFs are a more solid mechanism than are NBFs for achieving
the desired long-term objectives.
3. Investing
Many oil-rich countries are highly dependent on oil revenues. With no
present need to diversify, their progress in diversifying the economy is on hold.
Because economic diversity is central to prosperity, the most important use of oil
rent should be investing in capital formation to boost competitiveness and promote
socio-economic development. Gylfason identifies different types of capital that are
capable of growth, should these countries invest part of their oil revenue;47 (a) real
capital, including physical infrastructure such as roads, bridges, machinery and
equipment; (b) human capital, including education, training, health care and social
security that build up a more productive workforce; (c) social capital: formed by
investing in institutional quality and open government mechanisms that limit
corruption; and (d) financial capital, formed by investing in institutional quality and
mechanisms that create economic certainty for other investors.
IV. MEXICAN OIL DYNAMICS FROM 2000 TO 2014
After low international oil prices during the 1980s and 1990s, the period
from 2000 to 2014 presented new opportunities for oil exporting countries, including
Mexico.48 This was a key period for Mexican hydrocarbon production because it was
marked by increased oil prices and, at least for the first half of the period, increased
output. Nevertheless, the Mexican oil dynamics from 2000 to 2014 were marked by
1) a declining hydrocarbon production and reserves; 2) an increasing dependence of
44. Bernd Scherer, A Note on Portfolio Choice for Sovereign Wealth Funds, 23 FIN. MARKETS AND
PORTFOLIO MGMT. 315, 324 (2009).
45. Id.; Barma, supra note 5, at 179; SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUND INST., FUND RANKINGS (Dec. 10,
2015). http://www.swfinstitute.org/fund-rankings/.
46. Ahmad & Mottu, supra note 40.
47. Thorvaldur Gylfason, Natural Resource Endowment: A Mixed Blessing?, in BEYOND THE CURSE:
POLICIES TO HARNESS THE POWER OF NATURAL RESOURCES 10, 7–34 (Rabah Arezki et al. eds., 2011).
48. The period from 2000–2014 was marked by high oil prices, enabling the exploitation of more
expensive oil resources such as oil sands in Canada, shale gas and tight oil in United States, Ultra Deep
Waters in Brazil, Extra Heavy Oil in Venezuela, among others. These countries were benefited by the oil
price increase and took the opportunity. See Steven Levine et al., Understanding Crude Oil and Product
Markets, AMERICAN PETROLEUM INST. (2014), http://www.api.org/~/media/Files/Oil-and-NaturalGas/Crude-Oil-Product-Markets/Crude-Oil-Primer/Understanding-Crude-Oil-and-Product-MarketsPrimer-High.pdf.
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oil derivatives imports; and 3) spending of almost all the extraordinary oil revenues
obtained.
1. Declining Hydrocarbon Production
Mexican hydrocarbon production reached its peak in 2007, when Mexico
was the world’s sixth-largest oil producer, behind only Saudi Arabia, Russia, the
United States, Iran, and China.49 But beginning in 2008, Mexican hydrocarbon
production experienced an accelerated decline.50
In the seven years between 2007 and 2014, Mexican hydrocarbon
production decreased at an annual rate of 2.4%.51 Contextually, Mexico produced
around 4 million barrels of oil equivalent per day (MMBOE/d) in 2000;52 the
production increased until 2007, when the country produced approximately 4.4
MMBOE/d.53 In contrast with the 2007 yield, the national production in 2014 was
roughly 3.6 MMBOE/d—a decrease of 17% (see Figure 1).

Fig. 1: Self-elaboration with data from PEMEX.54
Figure 1 shows Mexican hydrocarbon production over the last 15 years, which can
be divided into three stages. The first stage shows an increase of production from
2000 to 2004; the second stage illustrates the maximum production plateau from
2004 to 2008; and the third stage shows a pronounced fall in hydrocarbon production
from 2008 to 2014.

49. INT’L ENERGY DATA, supra note 6.
50. See infra Fig. 1.
51. Author’s calculation based on PEMEX data. BASE DE DATOS INSTITUCIONAL DE PETRÓLEOS
MEXICANOS [hereinafter PEMEX], http://ebdi.pemex.com/bdi/bdiController.do?action=temas (last
visited May 24, 2016).
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.

300

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

Vol. 56

Not only did production decline in this period, but proved reserve restitution
rates55 were poor as well. Mexico’s hydrocarbon reserves fell 46% in those 15 years
(see Figure 2). Although restitution rates have stabilized in the last five years, the
decline in proved reserves had a negative impact on the Mexican hydrocarbon
production.

Fig. 2: Self-elaboration with data from PEMEX.56
2. Hydrocarbon Trade Balance
In addition to the declining hydrocarbon production occurred in the 20002014 period, Mexico’s domestic demand for oil derivatives increased and is still.57
Hence, there are two direct impacts on Mexican hydrocarbon trade balance: first,
Mexico’s crude oil exports are decreasing; and second, the country’s oil derivatives
and natural gas imports are increasing.
These trends are evident in trade values: 58 since 2012, Mexican imports of
oil derivatives and natural gas are higher than its crude oil exports; measured as
barrels of oil equivalent (BOE), Mexico exported almost three BOE for every one
imported in 2000. In contrast, Mexico imported 1.7 BOE for every one exported in
2014 (see Figure 3).

55. Proved Reserves are one of the most important concepts in the oil and gas industry. Proved
reserves are the quantity of oil and gas that, under a set of economic and technical conditions, can be
recovered for commercial purposes and can be certified through geological and engineering data. See
REBECCA GALLUN, FUNDAMENTALS OF OIL & GAS ACCOUNTING 607–08 (4th ed. 2001). The restitution
rate, or replacement rate, is a metric used by countries, companies and investors to measures the quantity
of proved reserves added relative to the quantity of oil and gas produced. Id. It is desirable for a country
to add a barrel of oil of proved reserves for each barrel of oil produced. That means that the restitution
rate should be higher than, or at least, 100%. Id.
56. PEMEX, supra note 51.
57. SECRETERÍA DE ENERGÍA DE MÉXICO, SISTEMA DE INFORMACIÓN ENERGÉTICA [hereinafter
SENER], http://sie.energia.gob.mx (last visited, Dec. 10, 2015) (Secretary of Energy of Mexico, System
of Energy-Related Information).
58. Id.
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Fig. 3: Self-elaboration with data from SENER.59
*Crude oil and other liquids, natural gas and oil derivatives
**Natural gas and oil derivatives.
Though the Mexican trade balance has been getting worse in the last 15
years, it maintained a slight surplus in 2014 (see Figure 4). In 2000, Mexico exported
almost $3.50 USD for every $1.00 USD imported. By 2014, in contrast, Mexico
exported roughly $1.50 USD for $1.00 USD imported. At the rate the trade value
ratio is decreasing, Mexico will face a challenge maintaining the trade value surplus
in coming years.

Fig. 4: Self-elaboration with data from SENER.60

59. Id.
60. Id. *Crude oil and other liquids, natural gas and oil derivatives **Natural gas and oil derivatives.
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3. Oil Revenues
After 15 years of high oil prices, the Mexican federal budget became highly
dependent on oil revenues. In those years, Mexico exported more than 9,500
MMBOE of crude oil and other liquids and derivatives, such as fuel oil.61 The
revenue for those exports accounted for around $562 billion of real 2010 dollars.62
For the same period, those revenues represented on average 33% of the federal
expenditure budget,63 meaning that Mexican finances have been highly dependent
on oil revenues. In contrast, during the period of low international oil prices from
1989 to 1999, Mexican oil revenues represented, on average, 25% of the federal
expenditure budget.64 Thus, the dependence on oil revenue growth was around 8%
between 2000 and 2014.
On the other hand, bearing in mind that Mexican hydrocarbon production
started its decline in 2007 (see Figure 1), Mexico has managed to avoid financial
shocks. This is because the decline coincided with a rise in international oil prices.
Although Mexican oil exports were decreasing (see Figure 3), the revenues from oil
exports were still high enough to cover a third of the federal expenditure budget (see
Figure 4).
V. MEXICAN OIL RENT MANAGEMENT
Though Mexico has exported oil since the beginning of the twentieth
century, it has rarely attained the best external and internal conditions for rent
maximization and management. From 1907 to 1925, Mexico produced 1.3 billion
barrels of oil; and in 1921, Mexico was the second largest oil producing country,
producing 202 million barrels of oil (also the year production peaked). 65 Despite the
production peak, the international oil companies that operated in the country
obtained most of the revenues. From 1917 to 1927, three Mexican presidents—
Venustiano Carranza, Álvaro Obregón and Plutarco E. Calles—tried to address the

61. Id.
62. Id.
63. BANCO DE MÉXICO, FINANZAS PÚBLICAS, http://www.banxico.org.mx/SieInternet/consultar
DirectorioInternetAction.do?accion=consultarDirectorioCuadros&sector=9&sectorDescripcion=Finanza
s (last visited, Dec. 10, 2015).
64. Id.
65. See LORENZO MEYER & ISIDRO MORALES, PETRÓLEO Y NACIÓN. LA POLÍTICA PETROLERA DE
MÉXICO (1900–1987) 32–33 (Petróleos Mexicanos et al. 1990). Mexican President Venustiano Carranza
(1917–1920) tried to enforce a nationalization—allowed by Article 27 of the Mexican Constitution—but
faced pressure from the United States government, which demanded recognition of American companies’
interests in exchange of credit and loans. President Álvaro Obregón (1920–1924) tried to raise taxes on
oil companies but desisted in exchange for the United States’s recognition of his government, which was
tainted by a revolt led by Obregón and ultimately resulted in the deposing and assassination of President
Carranza. President Plutarco E. Calles (1924–1928) tried to restrict property rights of foreign oil
companies in Mexico and exchange them for 50-years leases. Instead, Calles signed an agreement with
United States Ambassador Dwight Morrow where Mexico agreed to respect the property rights before
1917 and the United States promised that future oil issues between Mexico and American companies
would be settled in Mexican courts.
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legal and economic situation of the foreign oil companies in Mexico. But, they all
desisted after U.S. government intervention.66
From 1935 to 1938, Mexican oil production recovered, giving the country
a second period of splendor; but it was rapidly eclipsed by the Mexican Oil
Expropriation event in 1938. After three failed attempts by Presidents Carranza,
Obregón and Calles, President Lázaro Cárdenas tried to regulate the Mexican oil
industry and faced continued opposition from U.S. companies and the U.S.
Government. Finally, Cárdenas decided to nationalize all foreign oil companies in
Mexico, ultimately resulting in the seven-decade foreign investment ban in the
Mexican oil sector. 67
Despite the expropriation event, Mexico lacked the working force,
knowledge, expertise technology and capital required for keeping the production.
Consequently, from 1940 to 1970, the national oil production was just enough to
cover the increasing domestic demand; and even in the first half the 1970s, Mexico
was a net oil importer country.68 Hence, for around 35 years there was not much oil
rent to manage.
It was not until the second half of the 1970s that Mexican oil production
increased again to become a net oil exporting country. The increasing production and
rising oil prices shed light on the Mexican economy, and there were increasing oil
revenues from 1973 to 1980.69 The so-called petro-dollars were flowing to Mexico,
but, once again, it was eclipsed by the country’s crisis in 1982.70 When the crisis
struck, it became evident that Mexico did not create any stabilization mechanism to
counter the negative effects of the crisis. Although Mexican output was high from
1980 to 1999, the international oil prices were low, making the oil revenues modest.
In comparison, the last 15 years were marked by increasing oil prices and a
significant national hydrocarbon production, creating a notable flow of oil revenues
to Mexico; hence the evidence points to this 15-year period as the one with the best
conditions for rent maximization and management for Mexico.
The next section will explore how the Mexican government faced the threeway trade-off on oil rent management. The key findings are: 1) while Mexico had a
stabilization mechanism used it at crucial points, the largest part oil revenues was
not directed toward stabilization; 2) they were not destined for long-term savings; 3)
there is not conclusive evidence for demonstrating that oil revenues were effectively
used as public investment; and iv) it seems that Mexican government followed a
“hand-to-mouth” policy, using a good amount of oil revenues for current
expenditures.

66. See id. See also Owen L. Anderson & J. Jay Park, South of the Border Down Mexico Way: The
Past, Present, and Future of Oil Production in Mexico, 56.2 NAT. RESOURCES J. 257 (Summer 2016).
67. See id.
68. ÁNGEL DE LA VEGA, LA EVOLUCIÓN EL COMPONENTE PETROLERO EN EL DESARROLLO Y LA
TRANSICIÓN DE MÉXICO 106 (1999).
69. MIGUEL BASÁÑEZ, La Lucha por la Hegemonía en México, 1968–1990, at 225–29. (1990).
70. Id.
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1. Stabilization Function
One of the purposes of the oil rent is to function as a stabilizing mechanism
in case of price busts or production shortages.71 The planning horizon for
stabilization is short, and mainly used to recover from temporary price drops or
unexpected production shocks Stabilization mechanisms give governments time to
prepare their financial system and smooth the transition should oil prices fall for an
extended period of time, or the oil reserves are depleting beyond recovery.
Mexico has had a stabilization fund since the year 2000. In April, 1999, the
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) recommended
the creation of a stabilization fund to Mexico.72 The federal budget for the 2000 fiscal
year included an instruction for the creation of the Oil Revenue Stabilization Fund
(ORSF) creation, and from then until 2014, the ORSF received approximately $14.6
billion USD, representing around 2.6% of the oil revenues from the same period.73
The ORSF was first used to stabilize the federal budget in 2001 and 2002,
when international oil prices had a slight decrease. The stabilization was
accomplished despite the fact that by the end of 2002, the balance of the ORSF was
approximately $7 million USD (see Figure 5). From 2003 to 2008, the output
increase and rising international oil prices made it possible for the ORSF to reach the
sum of $6.2 Billion USD, the highest figure the ORSF ever held.

Fig. 5: Self-elaboration with data from INEGI,74 ASF75 & CEFP.76
71. See discussion in supra Part III.
72. JUAN C. QUIROZ & JORGE ROMERO, Recursos Naturales e Ingresos Fiscales en México 48 (2004).
73. Economía, INST. NACIONAL DE ESTADÍSTICA Y GEOGRAFÍA (INEGI) [hereinafter INEGI], http://
www3.inegi.org.mx/sistemas/temas/default.aspx?s=est&c=23824 (last visited May 24,, 2016); Informes
y Publicaciones, AUDITORÍA SUPERIOR DE LA FEDERACIÓN (ASF) [hereinafter ASF],
http://www.asf.gob.mx/Section/46_Informes_y_publicaciones (last visited Dec. 10, 2015); Indicadores y
Estadísticas, CENT. DE ESTUDIOS DE LAS FINANZAS PÚBLICAS [hereinafter CEFP], http://www.cefp.gob.
mx/Pub_Gasto_Estadisticas.htm (last visited Dec. 10, 2015).
74. INEGI, supra note 73.
75. ASF, supra note 73.
76. CEFP, supra note 73.
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The first major stabilization occurred in 2009, when the most significant
international oil price shock occurred, lasting for two years. In 2009 and 2010,
Mexican oil revenues were around $20 and $10 billion dollars less than in 2008,
respectively;77 yet the Federal Budget went unchanged due to stabilization.78 Figure
5 indicates that the Fund decreased by at least 30% during this time.
It would be mistaken, however, to assert that Mexico directed its oil
revenues toward stabilizing. The 2014 balance of the ORSF was around $2.9 Billion
USD, representing only 0.2% of the oil revenues from 2000 to 2014; only 2.6% of
those revenues went to the ORSF, and barely 0.2% of those remained in it until 2014.
While Mexico had a stabilization mechanism and used it at crucial points, the largest
part of the 2000–2014 oil revenues was not directed toward stabilization.
2. Saving Function
The saving function of oil revenues differs from the stabilization function
in that savings has intergenerational and long-term components. The main objective
of the saving function is to assure that a share of the revenues could benefit future
generations by extending the living standards of the current generation through the
years.
In the 2000–2014 period, Mexico’s only saving mechanism was the ORSF,
which operated more like a National Based Fund than a Sovereign Wealth Fund, as
its function was limited to stabilizing the country’s financial system. Therefore,
Mexican oil revenues from 2000 to 2014 were not destined for long-term savings;
meaning that Mexican governments from that period did not consider the saving
function of the oil revenues.
3. Investing Function
Considering that oil is a depletable, non-renewable resource, prone to price
volatility, the literature recommends that a reasonable amount of oil revenues be used
for investment purposes.79 The aim is to set in motion a transition from an oildependent economy to a diversified industrial economy for promoting socioeconomic development. Thus, a third function of oil revenues is to be used in
investment.
In the last 15 years, the Mexican government increased public investment
through the federal expenditure budget.80 The compound annual growth rate for
capital expenditure in that period was 13%.81 The public investment has been
oriented in developing physical, health and energy infrastructures.82 On average, the
public investment represented 14.4% of the federal expenditure budget outputs
during those 15 years.83 Bearing in mind that, for the same period, the oil revenues
77. SENER, supra note 57.
78. BANCO DE MÉXICO, supra note 63.
79. Eifert, supra note 4, at 7–10.
80. CEFP, supra note 73.
81. Id.
82. See Secretaría de Hacienda y Crédito Público (Ministry of Treasure and Public Credit),
Clasificación Económica del Gasto Público (2014).
83. BANCO DE MÉXICO, supra note 63.
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represented 33% of the expenditure budget inputs, it could be said that oil revenues
sustained almost half of public investment. But there is not conclusive evidence that
supports that assertion.
On the contrary, empirical studies suggest that Mexican public investment
has not been done effectively.84 As oil revenues were consolidated into a federation
account along with federal taxes and other revenues, it is quite difficult to determine:
(1) the weight of oil revenues in public capital expenditures; and (2) if oil revenues
are efficiently used in capital expenditures.
4. Current Expenditures
For the years 2000 to 2014, Mexico did not have an oil revenue saving
scheme, and around 50% of the oil export revenue went to covering federal capital
expenditures and transfers to the ORSF. This raises the question: where did the other
half of the oil exporting revenue go?
A review of historical national accounts suggests that it went to current
federal expenditures (see Figure 6).

Fig. 6: Self-elaboration with data from Banco de Mexico85
Current expenditures are not considered as part of the Eifert et al. three-way
trade-off that oil exporting countries face in oil rent management. 86 The reason may
be that the authors assume that the governments of oil-rich countries understand and
consider oil to be a wealth-producing asset rather than a trading commodity; and seek

84. Joan Costa-i-Font, Eduardo Rodriguez-Oreggia & Dario Luna, Political Competition and Pork
Barrel Politics in the Allocation of Public Investment in Mexico. (Ctr. of Border Econ. Stud., Working
Paper No. 10, 2002); Joan Costa-i-Font & Eduardo Rodriguez-Oreggia, Path Dependency and the
Allocation of Public Investment in Mexico 24 ENVTL. AND PLAN. C: GOV’T AND POL’Y 297, 297–311
(2006); Eduardo Rodriguez-Oreggia & Andrés Rodriguez-Pose, The Regional Returns of Public
Investment Policies in Mexico 32 WORLD DEV. 1545, 1545–1562 (2004).
85. BANCO DE MÉXICO, supra note 63.
86. Eifert, supra note 4, at 3–5.
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to use revenues produced by that asset for 1) stabilizing the present economy; 2)
saving for the future; or 3) investing in living and future generations.
Nonetheless, oil revenues represent not only an asset but also a window of
opportunity for governments to increase the quantity or quality of public and quasipublic goods without raising the fiscal burden through new or higher taxes.87
Therefore, before facing the three-way trade-off, political elites face an allocation
trade-off on how much money should go to current expenditures. The remnants face
the aforementioned three-way trade-off.
Using oil revenues for current expenditures and to maintain fiscal balance
each year is considered a “hand-to-mouth” policy.88 Considering how most of
Mexico’s oil exporting revenues were consolidated into a federal account each year
and used for current and capital expenditures from 2000 to 2014, Mexico could be
said to have followed a “hand-to-mouth” policy. In other words, during this period,
the other half of the Mexican oil exporting revenues were used to cover the current
expenditure deficits.89 This fact suggests that, at least for the last 15 years, Mexico
treated its oil endowments as trading commodities rather than long-term, wealthproducing assets.
VI. MEXICO’S NEW OIL FUND
In December of 2013, Mexico’s Congress amended three articles of the
Mexican Constitution—25th, 27th, and 28th—and introduced 21 transitory articles.
This legislative product is better known as the Mexican Energy Reform of 2013. The
Energy Reform creates a new legal framework for the Mexican Energy Sector and
aims to solve a set of structural challenges, including the oil rent management
scheme. This section will explore: 1) the creation of the Mexican Oil Fund for the
Stabilization and Development (the Fund); 2) its structure and functions; and 3) the
challenges that the Fund will face in the near future.
1. Creation of the Mexican Oil Fund
Perhaps the most important change introduced by the Energy Reform is that
private oil companies are now allowed to participate in hydrocarbon upstream
activities.90 The Mexican Congress decided that an oil sector opening required a new
rent management mechanism; hence, on December 2013, the Energy Reform
introduced the following text to Article 28, paragraph 6, of the Mexican
Constitution:91

87. Barma, supra note 5, at 29.
88. Hajime Takizawa, Edward H. Gardner & Kenichi Ueda, Are Developing Countries Better Off
Spending Their Oil Wealth Upfront? 3–4 (IMF, Working Paper No. 141, 2004).
89. BANCO DE MÉXICO, supra note 63.
90. See CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS MEXICANOS [C.P.] (Const. of Mexico).,
art. 25, 27, 28, Diario Oficial de la Federación [DO] (Official Journal of the Federation), 5 de febrero,
1917 (Feb. 5, 1917) (reformada 10 de julio, 2015) (amended July 10, 2015).
91. C.P., art. 28, DO, 5 de noviembre, 1917 (Nov. 5, 1917) (reformada 20 de diciembre de 2013)
(amended Dec. 20, 2013) (“El Estado contará con un fideicomiso público denominado Fondo Mexicano
del Petróleo para la Estabilización y el Desarrollo, cuya Institución Fiduciaria será el banco central y
tendrá por objeto, en los términos que establezca la ley, recibir, administrar y distribuir los ingresos
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The State will have a public trust called the Mexican Oil Fund for
Stabilization and Development, whose Fiduciary will be the
Central Bank and which shall have as its purpose, pursuant to the
law, the receipt, management and distribution of income derived
from the allocations and contracts referred to in paragraph seven
of article 27 of this Constitution, except for the taxes.
The next step in the Fund’s creation was made on August 2014, when Congress
passed the Mexican Oil Fund Law, which provides the specific normative
framework.92 Then, on September 30, the Finance Ministry and the Bank of Mexico
signed the Fund’s Constitution Contract,93 allowing the Fund to manage the oil
revenues starting January 1, 2015.
2. Characteristics of the Mexican Oil Fund
Transitory Article 14 of the Constitutional Energy Reform94 indicates that
the Fund’s main function is to transfer resources to: (1) companies with oil
production contracts granted by the State;95 (2) the Oil Revenue Stabilization Fund
and States Income Stabilization Fund;96 (3) the Hydrocarbon Extraction Fund and
energy research funds;97 (4) the Federal Treasury for budgeting purposes;98 (5) longterm saving vehicles; and (6) investment and productive spending99 (see Figure 7).

derivados de las asignaciones y contratos a que se refiere el párrafo séptimo del artículo 27 de esta
Constitución, con excepción de los impuestos”).
92. LFMED (Mex.).
93. Fondo Mexicano del Petroleo, Normatividad, FMP (Dec. 10, 2015) http://www.fmped.org.mx/
normas/.
94. Transitory Article 14, DO, 8 de agosto, 2014 (Aug. 11, 2014).
95. Id. (“El Fondo Mexicano del Petróleo para la Estabilización y el Desarrollo será el encargado de
recibir todos los ingresos, con excepción de los impuestos, que correspondan al Estado Mexicano
derivados de las asignaciones y contratos a que se refiere el párrafo séptimo del artículo 27 de esta
Constitución. Los ingresos se administrarán y distribuirán conforme a la siguiente prelación y conforme
se establezca en la ley para:
1. Realizar los pagos establecidos en dichas asignaciones y contratos.”).
96. Id. (“2. Realizar las transferencias a los Fondos de Estabilización de los Ingresos Petroleros y de
Estabilización de los Ingresos de las Entidades Federativas”).
97. Id. (“3. Realizar las transferencias al Fondo de Extracción de Hidrocarburos; a los fondos de
investigación en materia de hidrocarburos y Dirección General de Servicios de Documentación,
Información y Análisis Dirección de Servicios de Investigación y Análisis Subdirección de Análisis de
Política Interior 45 sustentabilidad energética, y en materia de fiscalización petrolera.”).
98. Id. (“4. Transferir a la Tesorería de la Federación los recursos necesarios para que los ingresos
petroleros del Gobierno Federal que se destinan a cubrir el Presupuesto de Egresos de la Federación de
cada año”).
99. Transitory Article 14, DO, 8 de agosto, 2014 (Aug. 11, 2014) (“5. Destinar recursos al ahorro de
largo plazo, incluyendo inversión en activos financieros.”).
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Fig. 7. Mexican Oil Fund transfers

Fig. 7: Self-elaboration with data from FMP100
Despite these priorities, Transitory Article 15 of the Constitutional Energy
Reform states that the Fund shall have a Technical Committee composed by three
state representatives and four independent members.101 Transitory Article 15 also
defines that the state representatives are the Governor of the Bank of Mexico, the
head of the Energy Ministry and the head of the Finance Ministry, which is also the
President of the Committee. The Committee has three main duties: (1) design the
investment guidelines for long-term savings; (2) instruct the trustee institution to
transfer to the Federal Treasury; and (3) when the Fund’s account balance is equal
to, or higher than, 3% of the last year’s GDP, make recommendations to the Chamber

100. Fondo Mexicano del Petróleo, ¿Qué es el Fondo Mexicano del Petróleo?, FMP (2015),
http://www.fmped.org.mx/acerca/tutorial/%7BCAE7E36E-0B15-1875-E35F-86C03FA49E4B%7D.pdf.
101. Transitory Article 15, DO, 8 de agosto, 2014 (Aug. 11, 2014).
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of Deputies, the lower house of the Congress of the Union, for allocation of the
exceeding amount.
3. Challenges of the Mexican Oil Fund
Despite the Energy Reform constituting a step in the right direction, there
are four glaring weaknesses in the Mexican Oil Fund presented by Transitory Article
14:102 1) the Fund transfers a fixed rate of oil revenues to cover the federal budget,
including non-productive current expenditures, which must be equivalent to 4.7% of
the last year’s GDP;103 2) the Fund has an annual cap on its savings function
equivalent to 3% of the last year’s GDP;104 3) the Fund has an overall cap on saving
function equivalent to 10% of the last year’s GDP;105 and 4) a special stabilization
function which can be used by the Chamber of Deputies.106

102. Transitory Article 14, DO, 8 de agosto, 2014 (Aug. 11, 2014).
103. Id. (“Los ingresos se administrarán y distribuirán conforme a la siguiente prelación y conforme
se establezca en la ley para:. . . . 4. Transferir a la Tesorería de la Federación los recursos necesarios para
que los ingresos petroleros del Gobierno Federal que se destinan a cubrir el Presupuesto de Egresos de la
Federación de cada año, se mantengan en el cuatro punto siete por ciento del Producto Interno Bruto, que
corresponde a la razón equivalente a la observada para los ingresos petroleros del año 2013.”) (“Revenues
will be managed and distributed in accordance with the following priorities and according to what is stated
in the law: . . . 4. Transfer to the Treasury of the Federation the necessary resources so that oil revenues
of the Federal Government to cover the budget of expenditure of the Federation each year remain in the
four point seven percent of gross domestic product, corresponding to the ratio equivalent to that observed
for the oil revenues of the year 2013.”).
104. Id. (“Únicamente cuando el saldo de las inversiones en ahorro público de largo plazo, sea igual o
mayor al tres por ciento del Producto Interno Bruto del año previo al que se trate, el Comité Técnico del
Fondo podrá destinar recursos del saldo acumulado del Fondo para lo siguiente”) (“Only when the balance
of investments in long-term public savings is equal to or greater than three percent of the gross domestic
product in the year prior can the Technical Committee of the Fund allocate resources of the cumulative
balance of the Fund for the following [purposes] . . . “).
105. Id. (“Una vez que el saldo acumulado del ahorro público de largo plazo sea equivalente o superior
al diez por ciento del Producto Interno Bruto del año previo al que se trate, los rendimientos financieros
reales anuales asociados a los recursos del Fondo Mexicano del Petróleo para la Estabilización y el
Desarrollo destinados a ahorro de largo plazo serán transferidos a la Tesorería de la Federación.”) (Once
the cumulative balance of long term public savings is equivalent or superior to ten percent of the Gross
Domestic Product of the year prior, annual actual financial returns associated with resources of the
Mexican Petroleum Fund for stabilization and development for long-term savings will be transferred to
the Treasury of the Federation.).
106. Id. (“En caso de una reducción significativa en los ingresos públicos, asociada a una caída en el
Producto Interno Bruto, a una disminución pronunciada en el precio del petróleo o a una caída en la
plataforma de producción de petróleo, y una vez que se hayan agotado los recursos en el Fondo de
Estabilización de los Ingresos Petroleros o su equivalente, la Cámara de Diputados podrá aprobar,
mediante votación de las dos terceras partes de sus miembros presentes, la integración de recursos de
ahorro público de largo plazo . . . aún cuando el saldo de ahorro de largo plazo se redujera por debajo de
tres por ciento del Producto Interno Bruto del año anterior.”) (In the event of a significant reduction in
government revenues associated with a fall in the Gross Domestic Product, a pronounced decrease in the
price of oil, or a drop in the oil production platform, and once resources in the oil income stabilization
fund or its equivalent have been exhausted, the Chamber of Deputies may by a vote of two-thirds of its
present members approve the integration of resources of public savings for long term budget
expenditures . . . even should the balance of long-term savings be reduced to below three percent of the
Gross Domestic Product from the previous year.).
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The first weakness of the Fund is the transfer to the federal treasury for
budgeting purposes, which must be equivalent to the 4.7% of the last year’s GDP.107
For the last 15 years, the Mexican oil revenues have represented around 7% of the
GDP,108 which suggests the Fund would have a positive balance. But unlike the
previous scheme, which consolidated all oil revenues in the same account, the Fund
will only have royalty-related income. Consequently, most of the Fund income will
go to cover the federal budget, including non-productive current expenditures. Due
to transfer to the federal budget, the Fund’s saving function will be limited to the 2%
annual rate. In contrast, in the last 15 years, Norway’s oil savings have oscillated
between 10% and 20% of its GDP.109
Two caps imposed on the Fund’s saving function constitute a second and
third weakness. The second limit is the first of two caps imposed onto the Fund’s
saving function: an annual cap equivalent to 3% of the last year’s GDP.110 This
means that not only will budgetary transfer make savings difficult, but also that the
Fund will not be able to collect extraordinary returns. Compared to Norway’s fund,
the Fund’s saving limit is suboptimal.
The second cap on the Fund’s saving function creates a third weakness: the
overall cap equivalent to 10% of the last year’s GDP.111 When the Fund reaches that
sum, the exceeding amount will go mainly to the Federal Treasury for financing the
federal budget.112 Again, the Norwegian Fund has no such limit; in fact, Norway’s
savings are almost 200% of Norway’s GDP.113
The fourth weakness of the Fund is its special stabilization function. The
Transitory Article 14 establishes that in the case of a significant reduction of public
income due to shocks on GDP, oil prices, or oil production, the Chamber of Deputies
can vote to use the Fund resources for stabilization.114 This means the Fund will
ultimately become a medium-term stabilizing fund rather than a long-term saving
fund.
In sum, the greatest challenge for the Mexican Oil Fund will not come from
oil prices or production shocks, but from flawed institutional design. The flawed
design aligns incentives for stabilization and transfers for budgetary purposes, rather
than independent long-term savings and investment.
VII. CONCLUSION
Three main conclusions can be extracted from this paper. First, from a
behaviorist perspective, political elites consider their oil endowments as trading
commodities rather than long-term wealth-producing assets. In consequence, the
three-way trade-off between stabilizing, saving and investing takes place after the

107. Id.
108. CEFP, supra note 71.
109. See ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, OECD ECONOMIC
SURVEYS: NORWAY (2014).
110. Transitory Article 14, DO, 8 de agosto, 2014 (Aug. 11, 2014).
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Gylfason, supra note 47, at 20–22.
114. Transitory Article 14, DO, 8 de agosto, 2014 (Aug. 11, 2014)
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political elites decide how much money will be used for current expenditures and
how much will be used for other oil revenues management mechanisms.
Second, 2000 to 2014 was the period when the best conditions for oil rent
maximization and management. During that period, (1) the international oil prices
experienced a sustained increase; (2) Mexico produced a significant share of the
world oil supply; and (3) in early 2000s, the creation of the Oil Revenue Stabilization
Fund (ORSF) opened an institutional window of opportunity.115 Despite these ideal
conditions, the ORSF’s account balance for 2014 was just $2.9 billion USD, 0.2%
of the total oil revenues since 2000.
Third, although the Energy Reform constitutes a step in the right direction,
the Mexican Oil Fund is weakened by flawed institutional design. The Fund has
limited savings potential due to caps and transfer to the national budget. The
challenges make it seemingly impossible for the Fund to create real long-term and
independent savings for future generations.
Though the mid-2014 oil price shock is affecting Mexico’s finances in what
seems to be an extended period of low oil prices, complicating the transitions,
Mexico has a window of opportunity for reducing its dependence on oil revenues,
beginning to treat its oil resources as wealth-producing assets rather than a trading
commodities, and undertaking the task to evaluate, reconsider, and redesign the
institutional structure of the Mexican Oil Fund. In doing so, Mexico can best manage
its oil revenues by balancing the pursuits of stabilizing the present economy, saving
for the future, and investing in living and future generations.

115. Notably, the fund was created during the “democratic bonus” caused by Vicente Fox’s triumph
in the 2000 Presidential Elections, which marked a transition away from the seven-decade government by
the Revolutionary Institutional Party (PRI) to the National Action Party (PAN).

